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Pension benefit rules depend on individual history far more than taxes do, and age plays a 
much larger role in pension determination than in tax determination. Apart from some 
simulation studies, theoretical studies of optimal tax design typically contain neither a 
mandatory pension system nor the behavioral dimensions that lie behind justifications 
commonly offered for mandatory pensions. Conversely, optimizing models of pension design 
typically do not include annual taxation of labor and capital incomes. After spelling out this 
contrast and reviewing (and rejecting) zero taxation of capital income based on the Atkinson-
Stiglitz and Chamley-Judd results, this article raises the issue of tax-favored retirement 
savings, a topic where the two subjects come together. 
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I. Introduction 
  When I was a young economist, I thought methodology was uninteresting and 
unnecessary, and just something old guys did when they didn’t have anything better to 
do.  I taught theory and public finance, and the applied theory I did was with an eye on 
relevance for policy questions, although I had had almost no experience with thinking 
about policy – just a summer job with the Council of Economic Advisors under President 
Kennedy.  Now that I am at a stage where methodology is age-appropriate, I think it is 
important.   
Some of this comes from the natural aging process, and some comes from my 
extended involvement in various policy processes, primarily about pensions, not taxes.  
In particular, I am concerned that too many economists take the findings of individual 
studies literally as a basis for policy thinking, rather than seeking inferences from an 
individual study to be combined with inferences from other studies that consider other 
aspects of a policy question, as well as with intuitions about aspects of policy that are not 
in the models.  To me, taking a model literally is not taking the model seriously.  It is 
worth remembering that models are incomplete – indeed that is what it means to be a 
model.  We construct multiple models to highlight different aspects of an issue, so, 
thinking thoroughly about policy calls for thinking through multiple models, and requires 
recognizing issues that have not made it into any of the available models.  My focus here 
is on the connection between basic research and policy advice, particularly basic 
theoretical research.  The argument for using multiple models to gain insight and 
understanding is not new, and was stated clearly by Alfred Marshall.
1  Previous research 
                                                 
1 “it [is] necessary for man with his limited powers to go step by step; breaking up a 
complex question, studying one bit at a time, and at last combining his partial solutions 
into a more or less complete solution of the whole riddle. ... The more the issue is thus 
narrowed, the more exactly can it be handled: but also the less closely does it correspond 
to real life.  Each exact and firm handling of a narrow issue, however, helps towards Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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(Banks and Diamond 2009) considered methodology more thoroughly as part of 
considering the taxation of capital income from the perspective of alternative theoretical 
models.  This article draws on that essay, after contrasting tax policies and public pension 
rules, along with the normative modeling of the two.  This contrast struck me when 
thinking back on some of the differences between the tax paper and the book on pensions 
(Barr and Diamond 2008) being written at the same time.  
II. Policy 
  Contrasting pensions with taxes on earnings, two elements stand out – (i) pension 
benefit determination depends on individual history far more than taxes do and (ii) age 
plays a much larger role in pension determination than in tax determination.  Pension 
benefits are typically related to a lot of an individual’s history, for example, the best 35 
years of indexed earnings in the United States, and sometimes a complete history is taken 
into account (as in Germany and Sweden, for example).  This holds for earnings-related 
pensions, both defined benefit and defined contribution.  Even non-contributory pensions 
typically depend on years of residence.  For example, the Dutch National Old Age 
Pension (AOW) gives a full pension on the basis of 50 years of residence between ages 
15 and 65; and is reduced proportionally for years of nonresidence.  The New Zealand 
Superannuation is subject to 10 years’ residency after age of 20 and at least five years’ 
residency after age of 50.  A full Swedish Guarantee pension is available after 40 years 
residence in Sweden after age 25; also with proportional reduction for fewer years of 
residence.  The Guarantee pension is reduced based on 18/16.5 times the benefits 
received from Sweden’s notional defined contribution (NDC) pension, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
treating broader issues, in which that narrow issue is contained, more exactly than would 
otherwise have been possible.  With each step ... exact discussions can be made less 
abstract, realistic discussions can be made less inexact than was possible at an earlier 
stage.” Marshall 1948, p. 366. Taxes and Pensions 090402 
  5
Inkomstpension, which, in the nature of NDCs, is based on lifetime covered earnings.
2  In 
contrast, taxation of earnings is focused on earnings within a single year, although some 
averaging over a few years has sometimes been allowed (and capital gains taxes depend 
on a cost basis from the time of acquisition). 
  As for the role of age, not only do pension rules vary significantly by age, but also 
the age-related rules often vary by date of birth.  Taking the United States as an example, 
retirement benefits can be claimed after age 62, but not before.  Retirement benefit claims 
are subject to an earnings test before the age for full benefits, but not after.  And the 
monthly benefit for a given earnings history depends on the gap between the age at which 
the benefits start and the age for full benefits.  In contrast, age plays some, but a small 
role in earnings taxation of adults.  For example, in the United States there is an 
additional standard deduction amount ($1,050 in 2008) for a taxpayer over 65.  In the 
United Kingdom, the personal allowance of ₤6,035 (for the 2008-09 tax year) becomes 
₤9,030 for those 65-74 and ₤9,180 for those 75 and over (but subject to an income limit). 
The age for full Social Security benefits in the United States is in transition from 
65 to 67, varying with date of birth (see Table 1).  Similarly shifting age rules by date of 
birth have occurred with pension reforms in other countries.  This is consistent with the 
common expression that a good pension system should not be significantly adjusted too 
often (beyond its automatic indexing) and should be changed with enough lead time for 
workers to adjust their voluntary retirement savings.  In contrast, legislated tax changes 
often vary by year. 
Pension systems use indexing to limit the frequency of needing to adjust rules.  
There is widespread indexing to prices and/or wages and, in some systems, for a life 
expectancy measure (NDC systems as in Sweden) or for a dependency ratio (as in 
Germany).  Moreover, the indexing might work differently for workers with different 
dates of birth.  In the United States, wage indexing of earlier earnings up to the year of 
                                                 
2 The ratio equals the total contribution rate (including that to the funded defined 
contribution account) relative to contributions to the Inkomstpension. Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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turning 60 implies that the wage indexing is done differently for workers with different 
birth years.
3  On the tax side there is indexing of bracket end points for prices in the 
United States, but no adjustment for how inflation hits capital and labor incomes 
differently (Diamond 1975).  Table 2 identifies four aspects of differences between 
pension and tax policies.   
Interestingly, there have been recent calls for significant variation of earnings 
taxes with age in contrast with the minor variations that sometimes exist.
4  An age-
varying tax structure appears administratively feasible and does not add an undue 
complexity to compliance and enforcement in advanced countries.  And it does not 
appear to violate intuitive fairness measures, although the transition to such a system 
might raise some issues of intergenerational fairness.  Note that these issues, 
administration, complexity, and perceived fairness, are missing in the typical model of 
equilibrium used for tax analyses.  Yet they matter for making use of the insights from 
those models.  I favor greatly expanding analyses of how age-varying earnings taxes 
might be done, but that is not the subject of this article.   
  Vickrey (1947) on income averaging not withstanding, a considerably larger 
reliance on earnings histories for earnings taxation, much less lifetime reliance, as is 
common with pensions, appears to go strongly against the grain of the history of 
                                                 
3 For someone who turned 60 in 2001, earnings in 1980 are multiplied by the ratio of the 
wage index in 2001 to that in 1980.  For someone who turned 60 in 2002, the wage index 
ratio used is based on 2002.  Price indexing also differs, starting after they have turned 
61. 
4 Recent analyses of age-dependent taxes include Blomquist and Micheletto (2008); 
Erosa and Gervais (2002); Fennell and Stark (2005); Gervais (2003); Kremer (2001); 
Lozachmeur (2006); and Weinzierl (2007). This issue is discussed in Banks and Diamond 
(2009).   Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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discussion of income taxation.
5  For example, Adam Smith (1937) writes of basing 
taxation on revenue, with no mention of a longer time span.
6  And two centuries later the 
Meade Report (1978) viewed taxable capacity as the starting place for income taxation
7 
and discussed the competition between total income (Schanz-Haig-Simons income
8) and 
consumption as the better measure – again considering annual measures, although 
arguing that consumption reflects lifetime considerations.   
                                                 
5 Vickrey (1947) was concerned with the impact of progressive annual taxes on those 
with fluctuating incomes relative to those with constant incomes.  He discussed averaging 
of total income, not just earnings, over different lengths of time.  Using a longer period 
for determining taxes is likely to reduce the built-in-stabilization from the income tax and 
lessen the easing of borrowing constraints. 
6 “The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, 
as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is in proportion to the 
revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expence of 
government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expence of management to the 
joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their 
respective interests in the estate.”  Smith 1937, p. 777. 
7 “No doubt, if Mr Smith and Mr Brown have the same ‘taxable capacity’, they should 
bear the same tax burden, and if Mr Smith’s taxable capacity is greater than Mr Brown’s, 
Mr Smith should bear the greater tax burden.  But on examination ‘taxable capacity’ 
always turns out to be very difficult to define and to be a matter on which opinions will 
differ rather widely.” Meade 1978, p. 14. 
8 Schanz (1896); Haig (1921); Simons (1938). Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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As noted above, a good pension system is thought to be significantly adjusted 
infrequently (beyond its automatic indexing) and changed with enough lead time for 
workers to adjust their voluntary retirement savings.  No one says anything like that 
about annual budget expenditures.  These are expected to adjust to developments on a 
nearly continuous basis, for example with the outbreak of a war or risk of a recurrence of 
the Great Depression.  And adjusting taxes along with spending is seen as important for 
the politics of spending and taxing, as well as part of a sensible response to changes in a 
country’s economic, political and spending-needs environments.  Yet, considerable 
continuity is considered good policy.  The Meade Report (1978) calls for taxes that 
reflect a concern for both flexibility and stability:  
“A good tax structure must be flexible … In a healthy democratic society there 
must be broad political consensus – or at least willingness to compromise – over 
certain basic matters; but there must at the same time be the possibility of changes 
of emphasis in economic policy as one government succeeds another. …  
But at the same time there is a clear need for a certain stability in taxation in order 
that persons may be in a position to make reasonably far-sighted plans.  
Fundamental uncertainty breeds lack of confidence and is a serious impediment to 
production and prosperity.” Meade, 1978, p. 21 
  An interesting question to muse on is why these policy institutions are so different 
– and I have not gone beyond musing.  Complexity of the world and of analyses makes it 
natural to approach these areas separately.  Whether thought of in terms of politics or in 
terms of policy analysis, “framing” seems to be a key issue in how these areas have 
developed.  How one starts thinking about an issue can affect how one finishes thinking 
about an issue (anchoring).  Thinking about tax policy starts as thinking about revenue 
needs in the short term, recognizing that revision of spending and taxes is expected in the 
following year, and substantial revision may occur after the next election.  While thinking 
about pensions includes concerns about the current benefit recipients, the focus is on 
rules that affect current workers (as both taxpayers and future benefit recipients) as well 
as current beneficiaries.  And the political process in the United States has been designed 
to incorporate long-run concerns through annual reporting of 75-year projections and Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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legislative rules that tend to separate Social Security legislation from the annual budget 
cycle.  The link between benefits and previous earnings subject to tax affects perceptions 
of fairness and political legitimacy.  While the annual spending and taxation process has 
great inertia, this comes more from the political process than from an underlying 
argument that the process should have great inertia.  Although some of the support for 
transition rules, including grandfathering, argues for a legitimate role for some inertia.  
Pensions are focused on a single long-run concern, acquiring adequate retirement income, 
while stability in tax policy matters for a large and diverse set of decisions where 
“reasonably far-sighted plans” matter.   
Empirical work on decisions such as retirement saving and retirement timing 
naturally include both earnings taxes and pension rules.  However, in parallel with the 
policy differences, theoretical analyses in these two areas also differ.  Apart from some 
simulation studies, theoretical studies of optimal tax design typically contain neither a 
mandatory pension system nor the behavioral dimensions that lie behind justifications 
commonly offered for mandatory pensions.  Conversely, optimizing models of pension 
design typically do not include annual taxation of labor and capital incomes.  
Recognizing the presence of two sets of policy institutions raises the issue of whether 
normative analysis should be done separately or as a single overarching optimization.  
Or, as I believe, there should be both types of analyses as sources of insight into practical 
policy issues.  Just as complexity in issues being addressed by legislation calls for 
considering different programs separately, with some concern for coordinating, so too 
does complexity in models call for separate and joint studies.   
Consideration primarily of a shorter time horizon in tax policy, for example in 
Mirrlees (1971) with a single period, makes it more comfortable to work primarily in the 
context of consistent, rational choice.
9  Pension design addresses long time horizons and, 
in contrast to the discussion of taxes, mandatory pension plans are justified primarily by 
                                                 
9 Some earnings decisions, involving career concerns, on-the-job training and education 
have an intertemporal aspect.  But this has not altered the short focus in taxing earnings. Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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an apparent failure, for a significant fraction of the population, of consistent, rational 
choice, in the form of a life-cycle model, to be an adequate description.  In addition to 
any possible reason from shortcomings in the life-cycle model, the focus of many policy 
questions on a shorter time horizon than lifetimes may help explain the focus of 
normative tax analyses on short periods.  I think there might be interesting ideas coming 
from exploring implications of a reluctance to rely too strongly on standard lifetime 
individual models when considering annual government taxes and spending.  But I have 
not started on such considerations. 
III. Capital Income Taxation 
Tax and pensions issues become intertwined when we consider taxing capital 
income and tax-favoring retirement savings.  To touch on some connections, I want to 
start by briefly going over the discussion of capital income taxation in Banks and 
Diamond.  That essay starts with the policy question of how capital income should be 
taxed.  (Table 3 about here)  The focus of the essay was the process of drawing inferences 
from the existing literature to help answer this question.  Our bottom line was that neither 
zero taxation nor taxing total income were supported by the weight of theoretical 
analyses.  We inclined toward relating marginal tax rates to each other in light of the 
ability of some people, particularly the self-employed and executives, to convert labor 
income into capital income and vice versa.  Since then, Johannes Spinnewijn and I (2009) 
have analyzed a simple model of work and retirement where optimal taxation calls for 
taxing the capital income of high earners and subsidizing it for low earners, as can be 
done within the rules for tax-favored retirement saving.
10   
Atkinson-Stiglitz   
                                                 
10 Kocherlakota (2005) provides an argument for regressive earnings-varying wealth 
taxation. He analyzes a model with asymmetric information about stochastically evolving 
skills, which is not present in Diamond and Spinnewijn (2009).  On the other hand, see 
Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) on the optimality of the Nordic dual income tax. Taxes and Pensions 090402 
  11
My starting place for thinking about taxing capital income is the Atkinson-Stiglitz 
theorem (1976).  Consider a model with two periods, with labor supply in the first period 
and consumption in both the first and second periods.  Suppressing a role for taxing 
initial wealth, savings from first-period earnings are used to finance second-period 
consumption and so generate capital income that is taxable (in the second period).
11  With 
only a single period of work, the model is about the taxation of savings for retirement.  
The well-known Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem is that when the available tax tools include 
nonlinear earnings taxes, there should be zero differential taxation of first- and second-
period consumption (no “wedge” between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution 
[MRS] and the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation [MRT] between consumer 
goods in different periods) if two key conditions are satisfied: (i) all consumers have 
preferences that are separable between consumption and labor, and (ii) all consumers 
have the same sub-utility function of consumption,  [ ] [ ] 12 12 ,, , ,
hh ux xz u x x z φ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ % , where 
12 , x x  are consumption levels and   z  is earnings.  The first condition states that the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption does not depend on labor 
supply.  And the second requires all consumers to be the same in their interest in 
smoothing consumption across their life-cycle.  
The theorem extends to having many periods of consumption with a single period 
of labor.  It also extends to multiple periods of earnings provided lifetime taxation can be 
a general function of the earnings in all periods.  An interesting extension (Kaplow 2006; 
Konishi 1995; Laroque 2005) is that for  any earned income tax function, given the same 
preference assumptions, moving from distortionary consumption taxes to non-distorting 
consumption taxes can be coupled with a change in the earnings tax in order to have a 
Pareto gain.   
Before arguing for zero capital income taxation on the basis of the theorem, it is 
appropriate to consider the robustness of the result relative to our understanding of the 
workings of the economy (see Table 4).  With non-separability between consumption and 
                                                 
11 With only safe assets, this can be considered taxation of savings. Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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labor, from the Corlett-Hague (1953) analysis, a key issue for the sign of taxing capital 
income – taxing versus subsidizing - is the pattern of the cross-elasticities between labor 
supply and consumption levels in the two periods.  However, not much is known about 
these cross-elasticities and thus there is not a good reason from this argument to reject the 
zero tax policy implication.   
With separability preserved, a second consideration would be that the subutility 
functions of consumption are not the same for everyone.  Saez (2002) shows that the 
Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem does not generally hold with differences in discount rates, and, 
therefore, desired savings rates, across individuals with different skills.  Saez argues that 
it is plausible that there is a positive correlation between labor skill level (wage rate) and 
the savings rate and cites some supporting evidence.  Banks and Diamond reviews more 
of the evidence on individual savings.  Saez provides a condition to sign the preferred 
direction of introduced taxation of capital income.  Diamond and Spinnewijn (2009) 
builds on this analysis, using a model with jobs, rather than choice of hours by workers 
facing a given wage rate.  In a four-types model (two wage rates and two discount 
factors) they show that starting with the optimal earnings tax, introduction of a small tax 
on savings of high earners raises social welfare, as does introduction of a small subsidy 
on savings of low earners.  Both introductions ease the binding incentive compatibility 
constraint.  The result makes no use of the correlation across types, although it does 
assume that at the optimum all higher skilled workers hold the higher output job.  With a 
restriction on preferences, they also show that the optimal linear earnings-varying savings 
tax has the same character.  And Tenhunen and Tuomala (2009) calculate the mechanism 
design optimum with the usual labor market and find implicit marginal taxation of 
savings for one high skill person and implicit marginal subsidization of savings for one 
low skill person for all but the highest correlations.   
Uncertain future earnings Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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While the natural way to consider uncertain future earnings
12 is in a two-period 
model with both work and consumption in both periods, the basic point can be made in a 
model with work only in the second-period.  The key assumption is that a consumption 
decision is made before the individual’s second-period wage is known.  In the Atkinson-
Stiglitz model, a worker knows full life-time income before doing any consumption.  But 
when consumption decisions are taken before earnings uncertainties are resolved the 
Atkinson-Stiglitz result does not hold.  With earnings occurring only in the second 
period, first-period consumption is chosen before the uncertainty about future earnings is 
resolved.  In this model, second-period consumption should be taxed at the margin 
relative to first-period consumption.  This result holds whether there is general taxation of 
earnings and savings or only a linear tax on savings with a nonlinear tax on earnings.  
Indeed, in this case we get an inverse Euler equation: 
 




h h dF w
ux pu xw δ
⎛⎞
= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫  
where w is the random second-period wage and  2 p  is the price of second-period 
consumption.  This implies implicit marginal taxation of savings: 
  [ ] () [ ] ( ) [ ] 12 2 '/ '
hh ux p ux wd F w δ ⎡⎤ < ⎣⎦ ∫  
With uncertain (future) wage rates, the government would like to provide 
insurance by lowering after-tax earnings in the event of high wages in order to raise after-
tax earnings in the event of low wages.  With asymmetric information the government is 
inferring wage rates from earnings and is limited by the ability of someone with a high 
                                                 
12 Articles examining uncertain future earnings include Cremer and Gahvari (1995); 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1982, 1986); Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003); 
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006); Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning (2007); Rogerson 
(1985). Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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wage rate to choose low earnings nevertheless.  The incentive compatibility constraint is 
that those with high wage rates must find it in their interest to work harder and earn a 
higher amount.  But, a worker intending to earn a low amount despite a high wage rate 
has a higher valuation of savings than if the worker were planning to earn a high amount 
(assuming normality of consumption).  Thus taxing savings eases the incentive 
compatibility constraint by making it less attractive to work less in the future.  One 
example is that retirement tends to be at an earlier age for those with more accumulated 
savings (earnings opportunities held constant).  Thus, discouraging savings encourages 
later retirement and permits more generous pensions for those who need to retire early 
and so have lower accumulated lifetime earnings.   
This result has appeared in the pension literature as part of design of a pension 
system to recognize that some workers lose good earnings opportunities while others do 
not.  To provide lifetime earnings insurance, the encouragement for delayed retirement 
should be less than fully actuarial, implying an implicit tax on continued work.  In the 
setting of providing insurance in this way, discouraging savings is part of providing 
insurance more efficiently.  This result appears in models of pension design that have no 
income taxes, so it is not clear how it would carry over, if at all, in models that also have 
standard annual taxation of earnings, not just lifetime taxes.   
I want to pass quickly through the other arguments I have identified as blocking 
the Atkinson-Stiglitz result.  Standard modeling assumes perfect observation of capital 
and labor incomes.  This omits the ability of some workers, particularly the self-
employed, to legally transform labor income into capital income (and vice versa).  Pirttilä 
and Selin (2006) found significant shifts of labor income to capital income among the 
self-employed after the 1993 Finnish tax reform to a dual income tax with a lower rate on 
capital income.  On a more widespread basis, labor effort devoted to earning a higher 
return on savings also represents a shifting from labor income to capital income.  
Christiansen and Tuomala (2007) examine a model with costly (but legal) conversion of 
labor income into capital income.  Despite preferences that would result in a zero tax on 
capital income in the absence of the ability to shift income, they find a positive tax on 
capital income.  Gordon and Slemrod (1998) raise the issue of shifting between corporate Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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and personal tax bases.  Even with an infinite horizon, the Chamley-Judd result of 
asymptotically zero capital income taxation does not hold in a model with an inability to 
distinguish between entrepreneurial labor income and capital income (Correia 1996; Reis 
2007).   
The models discussed above had perfect capital markets – no borrowing 
constraints.  But borrowing constraints are relevant for tax policy, providing another 
reason for positive capital income taxation in the presence of taxes on labor income that 
do not vary with age (Aiyagari 1995; Chamley 2001; Hubbard and Judd 1986). 
The models considered above have variation in the population in earnings ability, 
and sometimes in preferences, but not in wealth at the start of the first period.  With 
variation in initial wealth holdings and an ability to tax initial wealth, the optimum may 
call for full taxation of initial wealth, particularly when higher wealth is associated with 
higher earnings abilities.  If immediate taxation of initial wealth is ruled out, the presence 
of capital at the start of the first period, which can earn a return when carried to the 
second period, can also prevent the optimality of the non-taxation of capital income if 
there are no fairness issues further limiting the desirability of taxation of initial wealth.  
As a modeling issue, one needs to ask where such wealth came from.  Presumably gifts 
and inheritances are a major source.  But because these might themselves be taxed, and 
since gifts and bequests might be influenced by future taxation of capital income, a better 
treatment of this issue would be embedded in an overlapping generations model that 
incorporates the different ways that people think about bequests.
13  
Beyond these arguments, there is also an issue of the complexity of the tax 
structure needed for the zero tax result.  The extension of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem 
to the setting with two periods of earnings generally requires a complex tax structure with 
the marginal taxes in any year dependent on the full history of earnings levels.  For 
example, in a setting of two periods with two labor supplies, lifetime after-tax 
                                                 
13 For models with varying initial wealth, see Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau (2000) 
and Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2003). Taxes and Pensions 090402 
  16
consumption spending can depend in a nonlinear way on both first-period and second-
period earnings including an interaction term.  Once one envisions modeling longer lives, 
this degree of interaction becomes implausible to implement in a general form.  So it is 
natural to consider the issue of what happens to the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem in the 
context of a limited tax structure that resembles those commonly used.  The result of zero 
taxation of capital income does not seem to extend to this setting.
 14   
Chamley-Judd 
                                                 
14 Erosa and Gervais (2002) have examined the most efficient taxation of a representative 
consumer (Ramsey taxation) with intertemporally additive preferences in an overlapping 
generations setting.  If the utility discount rate differs from the real discount rate, 
individuals will choose non-constant age profiles in both consumption and earnings, even 
if period preferences are additive and the same over time and the wage rate is the same 
over time.  Thus the optimal age-dependent taxes on consumption and earnings are not 
uniform over time, resulting in nonzero implicit taxation of savings.  They also consider 
optimal taxes that are constrained to be uniform for workers of different ages.  It remains 
the case that the taxation or subsidization of savings is then generally part of such an 
optimization.   
Gaube (2007) examined the difference between general and period tax functions.  
He did not consider taxing capital income, but showed that the one-period result of a zero 
marginal tax rate at a finite top of the earnings distribution, which applies to the highest 
earner with general taxation, does not apply to the two-period model with separate 
taxation each period when there are income effects on labor supply since additional 
earnings in one period would lower earnings, and so tax revenues in the other period. Taxes and Pensions 090402 
  17
The thinking of the profession about taxing capital income has been strongly 
influenced by the work of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) showing the optimality of an 
asymptotically zero taxation of capital income.  In these models, workers (really 
dynasties) have an infinite horizon for their savings decisions and, in the long run, each 
period is exactly the same.  Judd (1999a) allows greater generality in the evolution of the 
economy than in the original Chamley and Judd models.  He obtains the result that the 
average capital income tax tends to zero even if it is not zero in any period.  When the 
model is interpreted as each generation living for a single period, a tax on capital income 
is equivalent to a tax on bequests.  Once individuals live longer than a single period, then 
one can distinguish between a tax on capital income and a tax on bequests.  
Distinguishing between capital income and bequest taxes, if one were taxing capital 
income during lifetimes, as argued for above, then, in order to have a long-run 
convergence to a zero average tax on capital income, one would be subsidizing bequests.  
With this formulation, analysis is focused, appropriately, on the analysis of bequest 
motives.  The relevance of long-run results from this class of models depends critically 
on the degree of realism of the underlying model of bequest behavior.  The literature on 
bequests does not offer a ringing endorsement of this model.  Indeed, it is unclear how 
important bequest considerations are for behavior, and bequest considerations appear to 
be widely varying in the population.  Thus I conclude that the Chamley-Judd result that 
there should be no taxation of capital income in the long run is not a good basis for 
policy, since it relies critically on bequest behavior that does not seem to be supported 
empirically.   
Nevertheless the issue remains that the compounding of annual taxation of capital 
income results in a growing tax wedge as savings are accumulated to finance 
consumption at later dates in the future – a point also made in models with finite lives of 
many periods.
15  As has been noted in Judd (1999b), such a pattern of taxation of 
                                                 
15 Taxation of capital gains does not involve this compounding.  In light of the absence of 
such compounding, it is not clear what basis there is for lower taxation of realized capital 
gains after a longer holding period.  Among the key issues in capital income taxation are Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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consumption in different years is unlikely to be optimal if a more general tax structure 
were available.  A starting place for thinking about taxing capital income over many 
years is to note the relationship between MRS and MRT if there is a constant tax rate on 
capital income, τ .  The ratio between the MRS and MRT between consumption today 
and consumption T periods from now is  () () () { } 11 / 1
T
rr τ +− + .  This gives the fraction 
of the available social return that goes to the investor.  With a positive rate of tax this 
expression goes to zero as T goes to infinity, and it gets small for long, finite time spans 
as shown in Table 5.    
Comparing the table to a tax on labor earnings makes several points.  A 30% tax 
on earnings puts a 30% wedge between contemporaneous earnings and consumption.  As 
the right-hand column of table 5 shows, a 30% tax on capital income puts only a 3% 
wedge between consumption today and consumption in a year (when the rate of return is 
10%).  But it puts a 67% wedge between consumption today and consumption in 40 
years.  The difference comes from the shifting relative importance of principal and 
interest in the financing of future consumption as we look further into the future.  Table 5 
makes it clear that the intertemporal consumption tax wedge depends on whether nominal 
or real incomes are being taxed.  This table raises the issue of how far into the future 
people are thinking when making consumption-saving decisions.  It suggests that if 
people have a long enough horizon, annual capital income taxation at a constant rate that 
impacts distant consumption will be inefficient.   
This is suggestive of a possible role for capital income taxation that varies with 
the age of the saver and/or with the time lapse between savings and later consumption.
16  
And it points to a potential welfare gain from tax-favoring retirement savings, since 
                                                                                                                                                 
the relative treatment of dividends, interest and capital gains and the role of corporate 
income taxation.  
16 I do not discuss the alternative approach of progressive annual consumption taxes.  
Analysis of such taxes has been limited thus far. Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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retirement saving tends to be for longer times.  Also, the role of capital income taxation 
when future earnings are uncertain suggests that capital income tax rules might well be 
different for those at ages when people are mostly retired, a common feature of tax-
favored retirement accounts.   
Tax-favored retirement income 
The focus of this article has been on the comparison and interaction of taxes and 
voluntary retirement savings.  But we should not lose sight of the presence of and role for 
mandatory programs that provide retirement income.  Standard arguments for that role 
are shown in Table 6.  Across countries, such programs vary greatly in the replacement 
rates they provide.  The tax treatment of retirement savings is important, particularly in 
countries with smaller programs, like the United States, and in countries, like Germany, 
that are reducing the replacement rate in their mandatory program and encouraging more 
voluntary pension savings.  
In light of the arguments for taxing capital income, and the problems raised by the 
compounding of annual tax rates, one can see a case for tax-favoring retirement savings.  
While one can withdraw balances from a retirement savings account, they are subject to a 
penalty.  Perhaps the penalty should decline with the length of time the funds were in the 
account.  It is also the case that someone doing precautionary savings and not hitting a 
zero balance will have held funds for a long time.  But the motivation is different than 
with retirement savings.  It would be good to see modeling of taxes with both concerns.  
There is also a behavioral reason for considering tax-favored retirement income since 
there may be a greater impact on savings than with a general reduction in taxation of 
capital income.
17  Thus, we have the question of how voluntary pensions should be taxed, 
something on which there is little literature, with the common structures listed in Table 7.  
How this tax favoring should be done is an important issue that I flag as needing research 
rather than offering an answer.   
                                                 
17 See, for example, Beshears et al (2008). Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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IV. Conclusion 
I conclude by repeating my call to avoid over-reliance on any single model and 
with the usual researchers’ plea for more research.  In particular, I think we have done too 
little study of the issues around tax-favored retirement savings accounts, studies that need 
to recognize uncertainty in future earnings, uncertainty in future spending needs, 
diversity in savings behavior and earnings opportunities, and uncertainty about future tax 
rates.   
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Table 1.     Age To Receive Full Social Security Benefits* 
  Year  of  Birth**         Full Retirement Age  
    1937 or earlier         65  
    1938           65 and 2 months  
    1939           65 and 4 months  
    1940           65 and 6 months  
    1941          65 and 8 months  
    1942          65 and 10 months  
    1943-1954                    66  
    1955           66 and 2 months  
    1956           66 and 4 months  
    1957           66 and 6 months  
    1958          66 and 8 months  
    1959           66 and 10 months  
    1960 and later         67  
 
*Also called “Full Retirement Age" or “Normal Retirement Age"  
**If you were born on January 1st of any year you should refer to the previous year.  
      
 
Table 2.  Contrast between Pensions and Taxes 
Pension Benefits       Income  Taxation  of  Earnings 
 
Dependent on a long history          Focus on a single year 
Dependent  on  age       Little  variation  with  age 
Dependent on date of birth          Varies by year 
Indexed for prices and/or wages, demography    Limited indexing for prices 
 
Table 3.  Approaches to Taxing Capital Income 
If there is annual non-linear taxation of earnings, how should annual capital income be 
taxed? 
 
  –  not at all  
  –     linearly (Nordic dual income tax) 
  –     relating the marginal tax rates of capital and labor incomes (United States) Taxes and Pensions 090402 
  27
  –     taxing all income the same (Schanz-Haig-Simons)  
 
Table 4.  Models where Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem does not hold  
 
 –  nonseparable  preferences 
 –  nonuniform  preferences 
  –  uncertain future earnings  
  –   hard to distinguish capital income from entrepreneurial earnings  
  –   borrowing constraints  
  –   different initial wealths 
  –   limited tax tools   
 
Table 5.  Ratio of MRS to MRT -  () () () { } 11 / 1
T
rr τ +− + . 
T  r=.05, τ =.15  r=.10, τ =.15  r=.05, τ =.30  r=.10, τ =.30 
1 .993  .986  .985  .973 
10 .931  .872  .866  .758 
20 .866  .760  .750  .575 
40 .751  .577  .562  .331 
60 .650  .439  .422  .190 
80 .564  .333  .316  .109 
 
Table 6.  Reasons for a Mandatory Retirement Pension System  
 
  –   free riding with non-optimal taxes 
  –   too little savings 
 –    poor  investing 
  –    too little annuitization: individual and joint-life  
  –   absence of age and history related tax rules 
 
Table 7.  Approaches to Tax Favoring Retirement Savings 
  –   Exempt contributions, Exempt accumulations, Taxable withdrawals 
(EET): IRA  Taxes and Pensions 090402 
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  –   Taxable contributions, Exempt accumulations, Exempt withdrawals 
(TEE): Roth IRA 
  –   Both EET and TEE available (United States) 
  –   Exempt contributions, Partially exempt accumulations, Taxable 
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